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Medicaid and
Medicaid Cost

Containment in
Massachusetts

Fredric A. Waldstein

The purpose of this article is to describe Medicaid's financial structure and examine costcontainment efforts to limit future growth of the program, particularly pertaining to Massachusetts. The principal focus is the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare and the
Massachusetts Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, the two agencies most responsible for Medicaid cost containment in the commonwealth. Because elected officials are unwilling to

face directly the troublesome issues surrounding Medicaid and
agencies responsible for cost containment have been

left to

its

growth, the government

define the scope of the prob-

lem, design remedial strategies, and evaluate their success. This process is found wanting
on several counts that are not necessarily the fault of the state agencies. What is needed is
a national cost-containment policy fashioned by elected officials that provides a comparative framework for evaluation

The

across states.

when Mr. Wilbur Mills [Chairman
Ways and Means Committee] asked me what his answer should be to the

inclusion of Medicaid in the 1965 law evolved

of the House

inevitable question he thought

would be asked during the

Medicare an 'entering wedge'

to a

insurance coverage for everyone?"

legislative debate: "Isn't

broader program of nationwide 'compulsory'
I

suggested that

if

he included some plan to cover

key groups of poor people, he would have a possible answer to this criticism. Medicaid
evolved from this problem and discussion.

—Wilbur! Cohen

1

all the scholarly literature on the origin and structure of Medicaid, perhaps nothing
Incaptures
better the
hoc manner in which the Medicaid program was conceived than

ad

these remarks by Wilbur Cohen, one of the principal architects of Medicare and Medicaid.

Medicare was viewed as the principal health care

legislation both substantively

and

The Medicaid program was an afterthought born out of tactical maneuvers
believed necessary to overcome political opposition to Medicare legislation. Medicaid has
symbolically.

never stepped from the shadows of Medicare in the minds of the public, politicians, and
the media,

who

persist in viewing

it

as a second-class, perhaps vestigial

appendage of

Medicare.
Fredric A. Waldstein

fellow of the John W.

is

assistant professor of government at Bentley College, Waltham, Massachusetts.

McCormack Institute of Public Affairs at the time he undertook this study.
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But the growth of Medicaid as a major budgetary item has been remarkable. Medicaid
assistance payments for the nation in 1988* are projected to be a staggering $47.8 billion. 2

Medicaid

is

the largest single item in the Massachusetts state budget, accounting for be-

tween 13 and 15 percent of the

total

budget. Expenditures for the Massachusetts Medicaid

program in 1988 are projected to reach $1 .5 billion. 3
The history of the Medicaid program may be divided into four eras. 4 In the start-up era,
from 1965 through 1971, states began to develop their Medicaid programs with various
benefit packages. It became clear that original estimates for Medicaid costs were severely
underestimated. The Medicaid budget for 1971 was double the original estimate, and the
budget from 1965 through 1971 grew 31 percent. The second era began with the 1972
amendments that expanded Medicaid services and broadened the definitions of eligibility.
From 1972 to 1976 the annual average increase in cost was 23 percent. The third era,
1976-1980, may be identified as the era of Medicaid inflation. Costs continued to rise at
an annual rate of 12 percent even though there was no significant expansion of medical
services. Indeed, the

number of Medicaid

final era includes the

1980s and

is

recipients actually decreased.

The

fourth and

characterized as one of fiscal retrenchment. Concern

over growth in Medicaid expenditures has been exacerbated by a political climate hostile
to government programs in general. The Reagan administration initiated a number of
program changes, and Congress included restrictive provisions in the 1981 Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA). These efforts have been widely acknowledged as

primarily cost-cutting measures, and the rate of growth has been reduced in recent years. 5

Between 1983 and 1987, the national Medicaid costs grew by an annual average of 8.4
percent, while total national spending for health care increased by an annual average of

8.6 percent. 6

Medicaid

Eligibility

and Caseload

Medicaid was established by Congress under

Title

XIX

of the Social Security Act as

amended in 1965 to provide health care for the poor. Participation in the Medicaid program by the states is voluntary. 7 Benefit costs and administrative costs are shared by the
states

and the federal government, but the

states are responsible for administering the

program.

Because Medicaid

is

an entitlement, the program must pay for the covered health care

costs of all eligible persons. Within federal guidelines, states are given substantial latitude
to

determine

policies.

eligibility

While

the program,

it

requirements, the range of services offered, and reimbursement

eligibility

requirements keep

nonetheless

is

many poor people from

taking advantage of

the principal source of health care funding for the poor in

Massachusetts and in the nation. 8
Federal Medicaid regulations require states to provide certain benefits to recipients,
including inpatient and outpatient hospital care; skilled nursing
services; laboratory

tive health care for children.

Medicaid

home

care; physician

and radiology services; home health care; dental care; and prevenMassachusetts provides additional health care services to

patients, including prescribed drugs; care in intermediate nursing

its

homes; adult

day health care; mental health care; and transportation to medical services. These options

make
*AII

the Massachusetts

budgetary data are for

fiscal

Medicaid program one of the most comprehensive
years unless indicated otherwise.
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in the country.

Individuals

may

qualify for Medicaid

if

they meet the criteria defining either one of two

recipient groups: the categorically needy and the medically need.

include

all

persons

program, the Aid

who

The

categorically needy

received cash assistance from the Supplemental Security Income

to Families with

Dependent Children program, or the Refugee

ment program. These individuals are automatically

eligible for Medicaid.

needy are defined as individuals and families who are not categorically
fall

Resettle-

The medically

eligible but

who

below established income thresholds and have insufficient resources to meet their

medical needs.

The Medicaid caseload

in

Massachusetts

is

expected to be approximately 273, 100 cases

per month in fiscal year 1989. Overall, the number of Medicaid cases increased approxi-

mately 4.2 percent from 1983 to 1987. Department of Public Welfare projections suggest
that the rate of growth

between 1987 and 1989

leveling suggests that without either a

will

be approximately

major restructuring of the

1

.6 percent.

eligibility

9

This

requirements

or a major change in the economic status of a significant percent of the population, the

Medicaid program has reached a caseload threshold.

About 65 percent of all Massachusetts Medicaid

recipients are children in impoverished

families and their parents. Elderly and disabled recipients account for approximately 35

percent. However, because a significant proportion of elderly and disabled require nursing

home care or other costly

treatment, they use a disproportionate share of the budget,

accounting for 75 percent of total Medicaid expenditures. 10

Program Costs
Medicaid
patient

is

service.

is

a vendor payment program operated as third-party coverage. That

treated by a health care provider,

The government pays

per capita income

ment and the

who bills

the provider's fee.

the

government

is,

the

for the cost of the

A cost-sharing formula based on state

used to determine the percentage of costs carried by the state govern-

is

federal government:

State share

=

—

—

(State per capita income) 2
'

x

.45,

(National per capita income) 2

Federal share

This formula

program

is

1.00

- State

share.

designed so that the federal government pays a larger proportion of the

maximum of 83 percent) and a smaller proportion in
minimum of 50 percent)." Because per capita income in Massachu-

costs in poorer states (to a

wealthier states (to a
setts

=

during the past two decades has been high compared with that of the nation as a

whole, the commonwealth has paid for 50 percent or slightly less throughout the history

The federal share rose above 51 percent between October 1 1977, and
September 30, 1983, reaching a high of 53.56 percent between January 1, 1981, and
September 30, 1983. 12 This corresponds with a time when the Massachusetts economy

of the program.

,

was quite sluggish. At the other end of the spectrum

is

Mississippi,

which consistently

ranks as the poorest state using the cost-sharing formula. The federal government has
never paid for less than 77 percent of costs for the Medicaid program in Mississippi in
those years for which data are readily available. 13

Medicaid costs can be classified
program's

eligibility policies,

in three categories: the

medical services offered, the

and the policies about reimbursement

65

to providers. Table

1
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how these categories have contributed to the rising cost of Medicaid over its
By the beginning of the third era the primary concern was how to reduce Medi-

illustrates

four eras.

caid's costs, since they had escalated

many

beyond anyone's

anticipation.

14

At the same time,

governments were under severe financial pressures induced by a lagging na-

state

economy.
While Congress and

tional

state legislatures felt obliged to

maintain the Medicaid program,

they nonetheless appeared unable or unwilling to address

its

problems. Kenneth Wing has

characterized the status of the program this way: "Inadequate in

unpopular and expensive, Medicaid
than

it

was wanted

15

at birth."

in its

its

structure and design,

programmatic adolescence was no more loved

Remedial measures were idiosyncratic and often inconsis-

ambivalence of the government and the public to the Medi-

tent, reflecting the political

caid program.

Cost-Containment Strategies
Because Medicaid
person meets the
state

must

program

is

an entitlement, states cannot exercise

number of beneficiaries or

limiting the

eligibility

However,

pay.

costs.

The

putting a cap on the

by such means as
amount of total spending. If a

fiscal control

requirements and the health-related service

this

is

covered, the

does not mean that the states are incapable of containing

history of the Medicaid

program

reveals the consideration and use of

four cost-containment strategies: cutting eligibility, cutting services, cutting provider

and making the system more

fees,

efficient.

The

first

two strategies could alienate con-

stituencies, a risk that politicians prefer to avoid.

The third

strategy traditionally has not been viable because physicians' fees and other

provider fees for services to Medicaid patients customarily have been set by state govern-

ments
in

at rates

Medicaid

is

lower than non-Medicaid rates. Since participation by health care providers
voluntary,

many simply

opt not to participate. Reducing the fees creates the

risk of further lowering participation. In addition, the health care professions are repre-

sented by

many powerful

cial security

The

interest

groups that oppose even tangential threats

to the finan-

of their members.

program efficiency, typically has meant a call to streamprogram and put an end to fraud and abuse. 16 This strategy is

fourth strategy, increasing

line the administration of the

popular with politicians in part because the political risks are minimal. Advocating a
reduction in fraud as a means for ensuring that tax dollars are spent for their intended

much opposition. And calls to streamline programs to
much of the burden on the bureaucracies that administer
them. Bureaucracies rarely engender much sympathy from the public.
A major complaint among both critics and supporters of the Medicaid program is that
purposes

is

unlikely to generate

make them more

efficient places

the fee-for-service system

is

easily

abused because

it

provides no incentives for either

providers or recipients to be concerned about cost containment. Health care providers

who

are paid to give services to recipients are the principal source of Medicaid fraud and

abuse.

home
that

17

Among the more frequent perpetrators of fraud are medical

doctors, nursing

operators, hospitals, and pharmacists. Typical of the types of fraudulent activities

occur are filing claims for services not delivered, filing duplicate claims, overclas-

and inflating the cost of services. A number of
documented various types of fraud and abuse in the Medicaid program. This

sifying services to qualify for higher fees,
studies have

18

evidence of fraud, coupled with the large increase in provider costs as illustrated in Table
lent legitimacy to

charges that the Medicaid system was rampant with fraud.
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1.

Table 1

National Medicaid Costs by Category, as a
Percentage of Total Medicaid Costs
Reimbursement

Medical Services
Offered

Eligibility

to Providers

Policies

(Utilization)

(Price)

(Population)

Total

19.4

45.2

35.4

100.0

43.5

30.4

26.1

100.0

92.3

-7.7

15.4

100.0

91.7

0.0

8.3

100.0

Start-up era

(1965-1971)

Amendment

era

(1972-1975)
Inflation era

(1976-1980)

Retrenchment era
(1981 -Present)*
*

Data are from 1980-1981 only. But indicators suggest that they are respresentative of the entire decade.
Source: Medicare and Medicaid Data Book, 1984,
ing Administration, June 1986), 31-32.

Document

No. 0321

(Baltimore: Health Care Financ-

The Medicaid Fraud Control Unit

On October 25,

1977, President

Jimmy Carter signed

Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments.
Medicaid Fraud Control Unit

(MCFU)

into law P.L. 95-142, the

Among other things,

Medicare-

the law authorized a

responsible for investigating and prosecuting

provider fraud in every jurisdiction operating a Medicaid program. The federal govern-

ment agreed to pay 90 percent of the costs incurred in fiscal years 1978-1980 in establishing and operating state fraud control units. In December 1980 the federal contribution of
90 percent was limited to a unit's first three years of operation, after which the federal
contribution would be reduced to 75 percent. Among the requirements established by the
legislation were the following:
To be

eligible for the increased

must be a single identifiable

matching

rate, the State

entity of state

Medicaid fraud control unit

government which the Secretary

[of Health,

Education, and Welfare] certifies (and annually recertifies) as meeting specific requirements. Such entity must be: (1) a unit of the office of the State Attorney General
or of another department of state government which possesses statewide prosecuting
authority.

.

.

.

Any [MFCU]

is

required to be separate and distinct from the State

Medicaid agency. 19

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) within the Department of Health and Human
(HHS) is responsible for the certification, annual recertification, and general

Services

supervision of the fraud units. To meet

OIG certification requirements

state

MFCUs must

on Medicaid fraud; have a
and have a working agreement

investigate provider fraud only; spend 100 percent of their time

lawyer, an accountant/ auditor, and a chief investigator;

with the "single state agency," that
the state as defined by the

is,

the agency responsible for the Medicaid

Code of Federal

program

in

Regulations.

The Massachusetts Medicaid Fraud Control Unit

2

The Massachusetts Medicaid Fraud Control Unit was certified by the federal government
in July 1978. Under the jurisdiction of the Massachusetts attorney general's office, the
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Table 2

Massachusetts Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, by
Professional Category: Number of Personnel and Percent
Change from Previous Year (in Parentheses)
Fiscal

Investigators

1978
1979
1980

11
11

(0)

1981

11

(0)

1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987*

10
(-9)
10
(0)
7 (-30)
8 + 14)

First

unit

Lawyers

Year

22
26
25
25

7
(

+ 57)

<

(-72)
(

10
14 (+40)
13
(-7)
12
(-8)
7 (-42)

8
14
13
11

8
11

(0)

9

(0)

9 (-18)
7 (-22)

+ 13)

6 (-14)

8
7
7

(

11

(

11

(-24)
(

Administrative Staff

+ 57)

+ 186)
+ 5)

16
16
18

7 (-14)

quarter

(0)

21

(0)

+ 18)
(-4)

7

20

(

8

(

Auditors

(

Total

47
65 (+38)
62
(-5)
59 (-5)
32 (-46)
52 + 63)
48 (-12)
41 (-15)
38 (-7)
38
(0)

+ 88)

(-7)
(-15)
(-27)
(+38)
(-18)
(-11)
(-13)

(

(0)

jnly.

was an outgrowth of the attorney general's Nursing Home Task Force, which was
1977 to investigate fraud and abuse in nursing homes. The MFCU, headed by

initiated in

a unit chief, reports to the first assistant attorney general.

The budget of the MFCU in its first full year of operation, 1979, was just over $1.6
The state contributed 10 percent of total expenditures during the first three years
of the unit's existence and has contributed 25 percent since 1982 as mandated by P.L.
million.

MFCU budget dropped to lowest level —
—
$1 .53 million
as the state failed to compensate fully for the loss of federal funds. Begin-

95-142. In the transition year, 1982, the

its

ning in 1983 Massachusetts significantly increased

its

contribution to the

MFCU budget

would continue to operate at full strength. The estimated budget for the
MFCU in 1987 was slightly more than $2 million.
The MFCU has experienced significant changes in the number and type of personnel

to ensure that

it

has retained throughout

its

lawyers, perhaps because

This trend

sector.

is

The most

history.

consistent personnel trend

is

it

a decrease in

MFCU salaries have not kept pace with those in the private

particularly problematic because

before a lawyer or an investigator

is

it

takes approximately one year

fully trained.

Table 2 indicates that from 1983 through 1987 the total number of personnel and the
number of personnel across professional categories had stabilized, compared with 1983
and before. The reason, according to the MFCU unit chief, is that the MFCU has identified

what

it

perceives to be

its

most effective personnel

addition, at least for the near future, the

profile, given

its

precluding the possibility of adding significantly to the size of the

stable,

resources. In

MFCU budget is expected to remain relatively

pensate for this perceived handicap, the unit has attempted to

move more

staff.

To com-

aggressively into

electronic data processing to increase the efficiency of existing staff. Savings in personnel

resources that derive from a

may be

more

efficient managerial

and administrative work force

reallocated to investigatory and legal personnel.

Prosecuting Provider Fraud

As

a prosecutorial unit within the attorney general's office, the

cerned with efforts

to

it is concerned only about activity that is statutorily defined as
and can be prosecuted. Even though the terms "fraud" and "abuse" are commonly

lated the law. Therefore,
illegal

MFCU is solely con-

bring charges against individuals and corporations that have vio-

68

cited together

expenditures

MFCU.

when

in the

Fraud

politicians

and academicians speak about the causes of unnecessary

Medicaid program, the two terms are
and can be prosecuted; abuse

is illegal

is

distinct to the

Massachusetts

not illegal and, therefore, cannot

be prosecuted.

There

exist different types of fraud

and remedies

cant sections of the Massachusetts General

Laws

them. 21 The most signifi-

to address

that apply to

Medicaid fraud and

its

prosecution are the Medicaid False Claim Acts; the Patient Abuse, Mistreatment, and

Home Receivership Act. The

Neglect Act; and the Nursing
the

most significant of these

alties for

providers

who

statutes in that

home patient. The mandatory

a crime to willfully neglect or mistreat a

it

reporting clause requires persons responsible for

providing care to report suspected abuse. The Nursing
protection for the residents of a nursing

and allows conditions

Home

home when an owner

Additional tools at the disposal of the Massachusetts

to the unit the authority to prosecute cases either in the
in

flexibility to

uses

is

Suffolk County, where the unit

pursue

its

Receivership Act provides
fails to

where residents are

to deteriorate to the point

is

maintain the

facility

at risk.

MFCU include law enforcement

authority to conduct investigations and seek indictments.

occurred or

is

submit fraudulent claims to the Medicaid system. The Patient

Abuse, Mistreatment, and Neglect Act makes
nursing

Medicaid False Claims Act

defines fraud and provides substantial pen-

it

A "home rule" provision grants

county where an alleged crime

located. Consequently, the unit has the

cases in the most expeditious manner. Another tool that the

MFCU

the attorney general's ability to request the judiciary to convene a grand jury

is to examine Medicaid fraud cases. The rationale for the special
complex and distinct nature of financial reimbursement fraud, which
requires specialized knowledge and takes several months to investigate.

whose

sole

purpose

grand juries

is

the

Table 3 provides an overview of the
ries of health care providers.

number of investigations

22

MFCU's

by professional categothe large

is

that did not result in either an indictment or a conviction.

unit chief said that as a prosecutorial agency the

The

MFCU always prefers criminal disposi-

in some cases unit investigators may feel that they do not have sufficient evimeet the burden of proof required for a criminal conviction. In that event the unit

tions.

But

dence

to

may

activity over time

Perhaps the most striking feature of Table 3

turn over the evidence to another agency such as the Department of Public Welfare

for civil proceedings.

Or the

unit

may agree

to a disposition of

"commitment

without a finding of guilt" until the party has met whatever obligation
of a negotiated settlement,

at

it

to probation

agreed to as part

MFCU will simply have the case closed or

which point the

dismissed. According to the chief, such a disposition

is

a hybrid between a criminal and a

civil disposition.

The

fact that

some cases are closed without

a criminal disposition does not

Medicaid fraud has gone undetected and unpunished. Frequently a case
the result of a negotiated settlement between the accused and the

includes a noncriminal disposition.

An allegedly

Each

side has

mean

that

be closed as

MFCU that specifically

some motivation

for such

an outcome.

fraudulent provider often prefers to extract himself or herself from the pro-

cess without the stigma attached to a criminal disposition.

a negotiated noncriminal disposition
willing to

will

make some

if

And the

gesture of contrition such as repaying

both the accused and the

MFCU is amenable to

the accused admits committing a misdeed and

money owed.

is

In either case,

MFCU accept the certainty of a negotiated, noncriminal disposi-

tion rather than the uncertainty of a criminal trial.

The symbolic importance associated with punishing criminal offenses with jail terms
cannot be overlooked, but in the American justice system most criminal convictions,
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Table 3

Massachusetts Medicaid Fraud Control Unit: Number
of Cases, Number of Indictments and Convictions, by
Professional Category (July 1, 1978-March 31, 1987)
Professional

Category
Medical doctor

Osteopath

Cases

Indidtments

Cases

Opened Closed
127

137

15

16

13

Dentist

116

103

Hospital

9
101

9
101

293

275

2

2

19
17

18
17
37
17

5

114

22
-

Podiatrist

X-ray technician
Nursing home

Home health agency
Therapist
Clinic

Laboratory

Ambulance
Drug supplier
Chiropractor

Optometrist
Transportation

39
20
118
14
23

1

14

1

21

5

3

-

2

1

-

11

1

29
68

Corporations

14
-

1

3
12

1

Individuals

-

1

1

Convictions

Corporations

Individuals

1

-

-

27

16
-

61

13
-

21

2

5

1

1

8
-

5

1
1

13
-

-

Durable medical

equipment
Residual category
Total

15

14

2

1

2

415

399

62

2

29

1,356

1,282

227

36

181

1

26

Source: Massachusetts Medicaid Fraud Control Unit.

especially those involving white-collar crime,

do not include periods of incarceration.

Among other forms of disposition, one of the most important is some kind of financial
settlement.

Table 4 provides data on the amounts of money owed by providers from
classifications in Massachusetts.

The

all

professional

financial data are divided into several categories

over time: overpayment; restitution; fines and penalties; costs and damages; and personal

needs allowances. 23 According to the unit chief, the change in dollar amounts over time

is

simply a matter of chance. In 1984, for example, a number of investigations were undertaken that happened to result in major prosecutions.

Evaluating the Massachusetts

MFCU

How well does the MFCU fulfill its responsibilities to reduce fraud in the Medicaid proHow do its efforts compare with those of other units across the country? These

gram?

questions are difficult to answer because very

little

formal review

is

required or takes

place. Conversations with personnel in the Office of Inspector General, the federal

agency responsible for overseeing

state

MFCUs,

indicate that reviews of

MFCUs are

without criteria or guidelines that might provide a framework for evaluating and comparing different state units.

The only

of a federally supported

MFCU.

criteria are those that are required for the establishment

The OIG cannot be held entirely responsible for this situation because no consensus has
how to measure MFCU effectiveness. While there is ample anecdotal evidence of fraud and abuse in the Medicaid program, a reliable means has not been
ever been reached about
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Table 4

Amount of Money (in Dollars) Owed by All Hearth
Care Providers, Resulting from Massachusetts Medicaid
Fraud Contol Unit Investigations
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that are available. Efforts to negotiate or

recommend noncriminal

dispositions

may prove

very effective as a deterrent to Medicaid fraud.

A corollary to this point is a caution not to evaluate the effectiveness of the MFCU
according to the amount of money
all

it

generates in terms of restitution, fines, penalties, and

other mechanisms that can be measured economically.

reduce fraud, not to pay for
accounting for

itself

economically,

Two specific MFCU

it is

can cooperate with the unit as

it

is

not giving priority to fraud prevention.

activities involving strategies

qualitatively evaluated: maintaining
that

MFCU is to

The goal of the

funds recovered. If the unit's primary concern

itself in

and principles of operation can be

open communications with
pursues

its

state

and federal agencies

mission and developing investigatory and

prosecutorial strategies that depend on analysis of past patterns of behavior rather than on

random chance to attain successful results.
By all accounts, the relationship between
sible for the

the

MFCU and the single state agency respon-

Medicaid program, the Department of Public Welfare (DPW),

out a professional relationship marked by a spirit of cooperation, the
difficult

time fulfilling

have recommended

its

responsibilities. Indeed, a

that rules

is

good. With-

MFCU would have a

number of MFCUs

in different states

and regulations be implemented by the federal government

requiring the state agencies to cooperate

more

fully with the units or giving the units the

26
authority to access data without permission from the state agencies. In Massachusetts the

positive

working relationship between the

MFCU and the DPW fosters the goals of both

organizations.

A typical example of the relationship between the Massachusetts MFCU and the DPW
their joint development and use of an antifraud computer system. The federal government has encouraged state agencies to participate in a computerized provider payment and
user-oriented system, the Medicaid Management Information System (MMIS). A major
feature of the MMIS is the Surveillance and Utilization Review Subsystem (SUSR), a
computer program designed to detect aberrant billing patterns that may indicate fraud.
The Massachusetts MFCU and DPW together developed and designed the state's system,
which the MFCU believes to be very effective. In addition, the unit is sensitive to the
need to maintain a high level of visibility and to keep the channels of communication open
with other government agencies.
The MFCU acknowledges that it has not made an effort to analyze past patterns of
is

behavior to determine whether

The

it is

operating as close to

unit has not maintained statistical records

on case

maximum efficiency

of its investigations. Without these data the unit does not have any
rately

where

referrals originate or

as possible.

referrals that designate the sources

way

monitor accu-

to

whether certain sources have a higher probability of

uncovering and leading to prosecution of fraud. 27 Careful analysis of cases and case referrals

could be used to maximize the yield of future investigations and

make

success less

dependent on chance. 28

The Role of the Department of Public Welfare (DPW)
agency identified to administer the Medicaid program is
Department of Public Welfare. Its responsibility, however, does not extend to determining what fees will be paid to health care providers. That is the responsibility of the
In Massachusetts the single state

the

Rate Setting Commission, which establishes reimbursements rates for
tional,

and social services purchased by the

state.
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29

all

medical, educa-

Detection and prosecution of fraud in

the Medicaid

program

is

the responsibility of the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, under the

jurisdiction of the state attorney general's office.

two aspects of Medicaid — determin—
should be removed from the state
ing providers' fees and ending fraud and abuse

The question remains why

responsibility for these

agency responsible for administration of the program. At
be lack of faith by legislators and other government
of a large social welfare bureaucracy to cooperate

least part

of the answer seems to

officials in the capacity or willingness

in

such ventures. 30 Because the Medi-

caid budgets of the state agencies increased so dramatically in the 1970s the agencies were

perceived to be part of the problem and legislators turned elsewhere for development and

implementation of cost-containment measures. In Massachusetts, developing cost-containment strategies did not appear to be a high priority within the
1980s,

when

additional resources

were provided by the

DPW until the mid-

legislature specifically to develop

comprehensive cost-containment measures.

DPW Cost-Containment Efforts
Substantial changes in the state's administration of Medicaid in recent years reflect the

DPW's efforts to respond to demands
what

is

now

for greater efficiency. In 1979, the

DPW developed

Agenda (SECA).
1984, however, when addi-

called the Medicaid Savings and Expenditure Control

Meaningful efforts

to

implement

SECA did not occur until

31

became available.
Primary responsibility for the Medicaid program in the Department of Public Welfare
rests with the Medical Assistance Division (MAD), which was authorized to employ 423
individuals in 1986. The changes that have occurred in the administration of Medicaid in
recent years include adding resources, redeploying staff, and consolidating program
management, administrative, and savings activities. Reorganization efforts were undertaken in response to four factors that were identified as exerting upward pressure on Medtional resources to

develop savings

initiatives

icaid expenditures: (1) provider rate increases, (2) lack of control over service utilization,
(3) substantial

long-term growth in the elderly population, and (4) expensive advances in

medical technology. 32 Growth

in the elderly

are constraints over which the

DPW has no control. The department's cost-containment

efforts

population and advances in medical technology

have been focused on provider rate increases and service

utilization.

The DPW's reorganization efforts resulted in a substantial budget increase for the Medical Assistance Division from $4.96 million in 1986 to $16. 1 million in 1987. The substantial hike was due to a transfer of funds to the division to accompany the transfer of
Medicaid-related responsibilities that had previously been performed by Contract Opera-

and Management and Support, two other DPW agencies. Table 5 presents a profile of
MAD employees by professional category. The organizational structure of MAD de-

tions

is

signed to facilitate both short-term and long-term goals, including
• restructuring

Medicaid management to better coordinate program and

reimbursement policies with savings policies;
•

redirecting the emphasis of Medicaid expenditure control

from managing

a savings agenda alone to managing spending as well; and
• focusing attention

The division has

on provider rates and inappropriate utilization of services.

identified several strategies to help

Among the strategies

is

meet these goals. 33

selective contracting with cost-effective providers for specified

services at a previously negotiated price.

A typical contract is based on capitation;

73

that

is,
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Table 5

Persons Employed by the Medical Assistance Division
of the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare for
Fiscal Year 1988, by Professional Unit
Employees

Professional Unit

Provider Reviews
Long Term Care/Elderly Choices
Operations/Provider Relations

104
80
80
63
40
22

Third Party Liability

Program and Policy Development/Health Choices
Administration/Human Resources
Cost Control

1

400*

Total
Total personnel

employed by MAD is listed by the DPW as 423, the number authorized by the
were unavailable for the 23 individuals unaccounted for.

state legislature. Data

Source: Budget Narrative for FY89 (Boston: Department of Public Welfare,
Massachusetts, February 1988), 400.

Commonwealth

of

providers agree to set fees in return for a guaranteed percentage of patient volume.
related strategy

is

to use the state's

A

market leverage and purchasing power to require

providers that do business with the state to accept Medicaid patients under specified
conditions. For example,

many

health maintenance organizations

(HMOs)

have in the

them to rely on hospital outpatient care and other more expensive services. The Group Insurance Commission now
requires HMOs with contracts for state employee health insurance to contract for Medipast been inaccessible to Medicaid recipients, forcing

caid recipients.

Much more emphasis

is

currently being placed on utilization review than was true in the

past to help identify abuse of the system or inappropriate delivery of services. These re-

views are taking place before, during, and after service delivery.

A typical review in-

cludes pre-admission screening of all hospital admissions to ensure that a treatment or

procedure

is

necessary and appropriately screened; ongoing case management of lengthy

hospital stays to ensure against high costs incurred in a hospital

other setting

is

identify providers

The

division

strategies that

when the home

or

some

adequate for care; and systematic audits of providers' billing reports to

is

whose

practices deviate

from those of their peers.

also examining and experimenting with several different reimbursement

move away from

the fee-for-service system,

which offers no incentive

providers to limit health care costs and, indeed, encourages the opposite. Capitation

one model

model

is

that

can give providers incentives to offer economical health care.

based on prospective payments

to

nursing

home

to
is

A second

providers according to the level

of care that each patient requires, similar to the payment structure under Medicare. Such
a system would encourage nursing

homes

to accept

than minimal long-term care, an option that

keeping such people

is

and

treat elderly

who

require

more

perceived to be more cost-effective than

in acute-care hospital settings.

A major effort is under way to identify and pursue any individual,
tion, or public or private

agency

that is liable for all or part of the

institution,

corpora-

medical costs incurred

by Medicaid patients. Federal and state law requires that Medicaid be the payer of last
it is estimated that 34 percent of Massachusetts Medicaid recipients have some
form of health insurance through Medicare, Medex, Blue Cross, or other entity that is

resort, yet
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liable for

payment before Medicaid.

MAD's Third Party

Liability Unit

is

responsible for

accumulating and processing third-party insurance information and collecting money

from providers

that has

been inappropriately paid by Medicaid rather than by the legally

responsible person or agency.

Another

set

of strategies focuses on developing service delivery systems that offer alter-

natives to institutional placement and care.

ternative

Many

patients are inappropriately placed or

and finding more suitable

left in institutional settings,

settings can

be cost-effective. Al-

models include community-based long-term care services

and disabled

to live at

home

that allow the elderly

with an adequate support system; managed care programs

and coordinated health care options

that strive to achieve preventive

for families, reducing

the need for costly emergency, outpatient, and inpatient hospital services; and pilot pro-

grams such as

Neighborhood Health Center, which offers capinumber of resources including Medicaid. The Massachusetts

the one at the East Boston

tated long-term care using a

Medicaid program has traditionally been open
signed to determine

if

ciently for a target group.

According

to the

to

experimenting with pilot projects de-

health care services can be provided

DPW,

Medicaid savings agenda

more

effectively

and

effi-

34

the "single
is

most important

the Medicaid

tool in support of the

Department's

Management Information System (MMIS),

which processes approximately 24 million Medicaid claims annually from over 29,000
35
MMIS is an electronic data processing system that has
improved the efficiency of recording and processing Medicaid claims by simultaneously

different medical providers."

reducing the error rate and speeding up the provider claims process. But
than a computerized accounting system;

by each professional unit

in the

also a

it is

management tool

Medical Assistance Division to meet

that
its

MMIS

is

more

can be tailored

record-keeping

needs.
In terms of cost containment, the Department of Public Welfare claims the following

savings in the Medicaid

program over time:

fiscal year 1982,

$11 million; fiscal year

1983, $32 million; fiscal year 1984, $106 million; fiscal year 1985, $155 million; fiscal

year 1986, $217 million; fiscal year 1987, $288 million; and the fiscal year 1988, $338
million.

It is

difficult to evaluate the accuracy of these figures without detailed informa-

tion about the

methodology used

savings are taking place

is

them. But one measure that suggests that

the annual rate of growth in cost of the Massachusetts Medicaid

program compared with growth
through 1987,

to arrived at

total national

in health care costs generally.

From fiscal

year 1983

spending for health care increased 8.6 percent, for Medicaid

8.4 percent, and for the Massachusetts Medicaid program 7.6 percent. This suggests that

some
can

substantial savings have

still

mean an

been realized. However, a 7.6 percent annual growth rate

increase of more than $100 million per year in overall costs to the

Mas-

sachusetts Medicaid program.

Effect of Cost-Containment Strategies on

Medicaid Recipients
The prominence given

to increasing the level

of efficiency and to controlling costs in the

Massachusetts Medicaid program apparently has not led to state policies, either intended

number of Medicaid patients. Indeed, as noted at the
number of Medicaid cases has increased approximately 4.2 percent from fiscal

or unintended, that have reduced the
outset, the

year 1983 through 1987, although future growth

is

expected to be

less.

A number of efforts have increased the access of the poor to health care facilities.
For example, since 1985 the Medicaid program has enrolled approximately 6,300 new
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providers, about 3,000 of whom are physicians. Success for increasing physician partici-

may be

pation

two

attributed to

HMOs who enrolled state employees to

factors: requiring

accept Medicaid patients and working with the Rate Setting Commission to bring physician fees close to market rates.

The same strategies have been used to encourage particiAs a result, nearly 25,000 new recipients were

pation by other health care providers.

placed in some managed health plan.
Justification for

moving

health care through

and other

many

in this direction is the

HMOs

is

more

commonly

held belief that preventive

cost-effective than services in acute-care hospitals

institutions. Virtually all of the

DPW's

strategies are designed to

recipients as possible to the least costly care facility that

is

remove as

appropriate to serve

their needs.

Managing

the Medicaid caseload in this

containment.

way makes sense from

What remains open to debate

recieved by Medicaid recipients. Very

is

little

how

the perspective of cost

this strategy affects the quality

of care

systematic analysis of the question has been

undertaken for the Massachusetts Medicaid program. The federal government has placed
the burden of proof on those

who claim

that the provision of health care for

Medicaid

recipients has declined.

Conclusion

The

history of the Medicaid

program is an example of what can happen to a public policy
It was and, in the minds of many, remains a derivative

initiated for political expediency.

program of Medicare without

a strong political constituency. Consequently,

when

example of wasteful government programs

that

it

drifted

was perceived to be an
unnecessarily burden taxpayers.

along without adequate focus from 1965 until the 1970s,

it

The simplest political solution for elected officials was to target fraud rather than other
aspects of the program and to hold culpable the state and federal bureaucracies responsible for running the program. Because those bureaucracies

problem, another bureaucratic

layer, the

remedy the problem in each state.
Whatever the merits of the charge

were perceived

that fraud

make

credible estimates of how

fraud existed, nor did they reach any consensus concerning

its

to the

drift

much

for federal

as the

was

was intentionally superseded by the

little

MFCUs were left
short, the

MFCUs

itself has.

for administering the

Medicaid program

in

MFCUs in efforts to curb fraud and abuse,

reason to expect cooperation between these agencies and the

several states the
hostility

The

government approval. In

Medicaid program

Because the single agency responsible
state

in

much

missions and criteria for evaluation once they had conformed

minimal standards necessary

have been allowed to

to

causes. Consequently, no

standards were set to measure efforts to combat fraud and abuse.

own

be part of the

and abuse were principal causes of waste

the Medicaid program, the elected officials did not

largely to define their

to

Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, was created

MFCUs.

MFCUs reported a hostile relationship with their state agency.

each
there

Indeed, in

Such

should not be interpreted as evidence of the state agencies' lack of interest in

fraud control or taken as a blanket justification for establishing independent fraud control
units. Rather,

it

may

reflect bureaucratic turf protection

tion of resentment by the state
terest

by the

difficulties

state

stemming from some combina-

agency for being cut out of the fraud control process, disin-

agency because

it

believes fraud control

is

no longer

its

problem, or the

encountered in transferring information across bureaucratic boundaries.
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In Massachusetts both the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit and the Department of Public

Welfare, the agency that administers Medicaid, claim to give high priority to developing

and implementing cost-containment strategies
ing toward that end.

The

in the

Medicaid program and

DPW has incentives to ensure that,

in light

to cooperat-

of limited resources,

services are allocated as efficiently as possible to their Medicaid clients. There

is

no

DPW ever opposed efforts to reduce fraud and waste. For both the
MFCU and the DPW cost containment consistent with their government mandate and
professional pride. The DPW did not implement cost-containment strategies until the
evidence that the

is

legislature allocated funds specifically for that purpose, but this behavior

is

rational

from

an organizational perspective. 36

Whether or not the

MFCU and the DPW have set realistic cost-containment goals and

are effectively meeting them

is

much more difficult to

determine. Because of the failure

of elected politicians to adequately define cost-containment criteria for health care, the
bureaucracies and those

who would evaluate

their

performance have no standards on

MFCU and the
DPW are having a positive impact on cost containment in the Massachusetts Medicaid
which

to base

judgments. Evidence

is

presented in this article that both the

program. But a definitive judgment can be made only after evaluation methodologies are
developed that can be used to assess performance across

states.

This will require leader-

ship from elected officials to produce a national cost-containment policy with clearly

defined goals and sufficient agreement about

how to measure whether those

being met to permit a framework for comparative analysis.

goals are

&fc>
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